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1

I. INTRODUCTION: MINNESOTA, LAND OF 10,000 LAKES

2

Lake access has always been a hotly debated issue in Minnesota.

† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Natural Resources
Management, Spanish, and International Studies, with honors, North Dakota State
University, 2001.
1. Minnesota technically has 11,842 lakes of at least ten acres in size. Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources, Lakes, Rivers, and Wetlands, at http://www.dnr.state.
mn.us/faq/mnfacts/water.html (providing statistics of Minnesota’s lakes) (last visited
Dec. 6, 2003). Minnesota’s “10,000 lakes” motto first arose in promotional literature in
its territorial days as a means of publicizing the state’s outstanding feature. WILLIAM E.
LASS, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY 25 (2d ed. 1998) (1977).
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In a recent decision, In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway,
the Minnesota Supreme Court added fuel to the fire. Under a strict
4
construction of Minnesota’s cartway statute, the Daniel court held that
5
lake access suffices for purposes of cartway condemnation. The Daniel
court reached its decision by interpreting the statute in light of the
6
legislative intent that existed in 1913. Since in 1913 water travel was
considered a viable means of transportation, the court held that cartway
condemnation is not appropriate where property borders on navigable
7
water.
Minnesotans have always taken pride in the vast rivers and lakes
8
intricately woven throughout the state. This land-water mosaic has
9
always been integral to state development. Yet regardless of how vital
Minnesota’s lakes are considered to be, the law must keep apace with the
dynamic and innovative society it serves. Today, the typical Minnesotan
10
thinks in terms of driving to work, not rowing. The Daniel decision
thus renders Minnesota’s cartway statute obsolete due to modern modes
of transportation.
In examining the Daniel decision, this case note begins with the
historical development of Minnesota’s cartway legislation and an

2. LASS, supra note 1, at 26-27. Public access to Minnesota lakes has always been
a lively issue because the majority of lakeshores fell into private hands long before their
recreational value was recognized. Id.
3. In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003)
[hereinafter Daniel II].
4. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002). Historically, a cartway was a rough roadway used
for carts. Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Today, a cartway is merely a classification of a type of public road, unique in character
because it principally benefits an individual instead of the general public. 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Cartways § 6 (2002). This note will refer exclusively to cartways due to the language of
Minnesota courts. However, it should be noted that an array of terms is used among
states in reference to cartways (i.e. private roads, ways of necessity, statutory easements,
rights-of-way, byroads, and access roads).
5. Daniel II, at 546.
6. Id. at 545. The court used the legislative intent in 1913 because that was the
year the cartway statute was amended to include the key “access” language. Id.
7. Id.
8. JOHN R. TESTER, MINNESOTA’S NATURAL HERITAGE: AN ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 197-265 (Mary Keirstead ed., University of Minnesota Press 1995)
(describing Minnesota’s lake, river, and stream ecosystems).
9. THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 6-7 (2d ed. 1975)
(1963).
10. See Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972)
(noting a liberal trend of thought since the 1920s in water access cases due to people
“driving” and not “rowing” to work).
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11

overview of the state power utilized in condemning cartways. A brief
comparison is then made between statutory cartways and the typical
12
common law easement by necessity. A description of the relevant facts
13
and reasoning of the Daniel decision follows. This note contends that
the Daniel court correctly limited its decision to one of statutory
14
interpretation.
The court properly interpreted the statute in
15
consideration of the state transportation arena that existed in 1913. The
cartway statute and its interpretation are then compared to current water
16
access trends in both statutory and common law. This note concludes
that Minnesota’s cartway statute, as interpreted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, finds itself antiquated and in need of amendment due to
17
the transportation needs of today’s society.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of Minnesota’s Cartway Statute
Concepts of cartways can be traced back to Minnesota’s formative
18
years. Statutory authority to lay roads originated prior to statehood in
19
order to promote access throughout the territory.
Originally, any
person who owned land without connection to a public road could
petition the county board to lay out a cartway in order to connect the
20
property to a convenient public road. The board was then required to
21
lay the cartway in a location most beneficial to all who would use it.
This statutory language of the territorial legislature is laden with ideas of
convenience and indicates an objective of expanding Minnesota’s road
system. This original language, however, apparently got lost in the

11. See infra Part II.A-B.
12. See infra Part II.C.1-2.
13. See infra Part III.A-C.
14. See infra Part IV.A.1.
15. See infra Part IV.A.2.
16. See infra Part IV.B-D.
17. See infra Part V.
18. The Minnesota Territory was established by Congress on March 3, 1849. JULIUS
A. SCHMAHL, Secretary of State, MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 182 (1913).
Although the state’s first legislature convened December 2, 1857, Minnesota’s act of
admission was not passed until May 1858. Id. at 185.
19. See MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 164.08
(2002)).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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22

statehood shuffle.
The territory’s cartway statute is thought to have been superseded
23
by a public roads act that was passed in 1857.
Subsequent to
statehood, for years only an obscure, discretional authorization to lay
cartways could be found implicitly in a proviso that specified the
24
difference in width requirements of public and private roads.
The
proviso briefly stated that county boards had power to lay out cartways
25
when petitioned for by town residents. The only requirement necessary
to initiate the board’s discretional authority was that the petitioner
26
desired the road.
Town and county boards were not again required to act on a petition
27
until 1913.
In 1913, Minnesota’s cartway statute finally began to
28
Boards were once again
resemble its original pre-statehood version.
required to lay down a cartway to any single landowner who had “no

22. See Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 283 Minn. 288, 291, 167 N.W.2d 497, 499
(1969) (addressing the “obscure” origin and purpose of the cartway statute).
23. See MINN. STAT. ch. 13, § 13 (1851). The original cartway statute is found in
Minnesota’s revised statutes of 1851. Upon achieving statehood in 1858, effort was
made to formulate a comprehensive compilation of all Minnesota statutes. This
compilation of those statutes enacted between 1849 and 1851 proved cumbersome and
confusing. Within the compilation, the cartway statute precedes “An Act relating to
Public Roads,” which makes no mention of laying a statute and which ends by stating
that “[a]ll public county roads hereafter to be laided out, shall be laid out in accordance
with the provisions of this act.” See MINN. STAT. (1849-58). For this reason, editors of
the statute compilation specify that although the original chapter was published, the
subsequent act in large part supersedes it; however, due to lack of clarity the two must be
read together. Id.
24. See 1873 Minn. Laws ch. 5, § 47 (codified as amended by MINN. STAT. ch. 21, §
47 (1873)) (specifying public roads were to be four and six rods wide, while cartways
were to be only two rods in width). One rod equals 16.5 feet. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1967 (1993). See also Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove,
48 Minn. 271, 274, 51 N.W. 606, 607 (1892) (exploring the development of statutory
roads in dicta).
25. 1873 Minn. Laws ch. 5, § 47. This language was refined, however, by an 1877
amendment that required a minimum of five petitioners to allow the board to exercise its
discretional authority. See 1877 Minn. Laws ch. 50 § 1. It was also in 1877 when the
statute first clearly specified that “such cartway[s] . . . shall be deemed a public cartway
for public use.” Id.
26. MINN. STAT. ch. 21, § 47 (1873).
27. All statutes prior to the 1913 amendment were purely grants of discretional
authority. See, e.g. MINN. STAT. ch. 21, §47 (1873). The original 1851 statute, however,
had required the laying of a cartway whenever there was lack of access to a public road.
See MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851).
28. Authority to lay cartways finally comprised its own section, instead of being
obscurely mentioned in passing under a section regarding the width of roads. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 2542 (1913) with MINN. STAT. § 1832 (1894).
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29

access thereto except over the lands of others.” This exact “no access”
30
Since its 1913
language has survived and remains in effect today.
31
rebirth, the cartway statute has undergone few critical changes. Today,
32
town and county boards are required to establish a cartway to connect
land to a public road whenever a landowner has “no access thereto
33
except over the lands of others.”
Minnesota is not alone. Currently, at least twenty-six other states
34
have statutes of comparable character. While some states have explicit
29. 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 235, § 55 (codified as amended by MINN. STAT. § 2542
(1913) (emphasis added)).
30. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002).
Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract of land
containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over the lands
of others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the town
board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least two rods wide
connecting the petitioner’s land with a public road.
MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002).
31. Historically, a landowner had to own at least five acres of land. MINN. STAT. §
2542 (1913). Today, however, an owner of land at least two but less then five acres can
petition for mandatory establishment of a cartway providing the land was on record as a
separate parcel as of January 1, 1998. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002).
32. MINN. STAT. § 645.44 subd. 16 (2002) (stating “shall” is mandatory).
33. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002). An alternative means to receive a
mandatory cartway is to establish that access exists, but is less than two rods wide. Id.
34. Minnesota is unique, however, in distinctly authorizing both permissive and
mandatory cartway establishment. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 1-2 (2002). New
York is the only other state recognizing each type of authority. Compare N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 335-a (McKinney 2002) with N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2002).
The remainder of states recognizing statutory cartways are fairly split. Some
jurisdictions recognize purely mandatory authorizations. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2766-401 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2002);
IND. CODE § 32-32-3-1 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 247.211 (2002) (applying only to
those isolated lands platted or subdivided for residential purposes); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
136-68 (2002); 36 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3122-1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-14-101 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-9-101
(Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 9). Other jurisdictions recognize
purely discretionary authority. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 23-1-130 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-1202 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-40 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-117; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3022
(West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-7-201 (2002) (amended by 2003 Miss. Laws 535);
MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-107 (2002); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39-1713 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-21 (Michie 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §
24-07-06 (2002) (amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223); OR. REV. STAT. § 376.155 (2002);
WASH. REV. CODE § 8.24.010 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002). Massachusetts has
specifically prohibited statutory cartways upon registered land, which is part of a unique
minority. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 185, § 53 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003). But see
MINN. STAT. § 508.25 (2002) (excepting all rights in public highways from certificates of
title).
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cartway statutes, others authorize cartway condemnation simply by
acknowledging that it is a valid exercise of the state’s power of eminent
35
domain.
B. The Power to Condemn
36

States have condemned cartways by eminent domain since
37
Eminent domain entitles the state to take private
colonial times.
property, without the owner’s consent, so long as the taking serves a
38
public purpose. The state’s power is far from infinite, however, and it
39
is curtailed in two aspects. There must exist a public use and the owner
40
of taken property must receive just compensation.
In Minnesota,
cartways are distinguishable from the majority of takings jurisprudence
because compensation is owed not from the government, but from the
41
private individual petitioning the cartway.
On this basis, a wellfounded concern may arise because it appears as though private

35. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1102 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 7-701 (Michie 2002); IOWA CODE § 6A.4 (2002); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40A-3 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 6 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815
(Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161).
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (7th ed. 1999) (defining condemnation as “[t]he
determination and declaration that certain property . . . is assigned to public use, subject
to reasonable compensation; the exercise of eminent domain”).
37. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.07[4][i] (rev. 3d ed.
2003). “A private road statute was enacted in Plymouth Colony in 1671.” Id. at §
7.07[4][i] n.90.
38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999) (defining eminent domain as
“[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the
taking”). See also SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.01[1].
39. Minnesota has long established that the state legislature cannot authorize the
taking of private property for private use. See, e.g., In re Schubert, 102 Minn. 442, 44445, 114 N.W. 244, 245 (1907) (declaring any statute authorizing condemnation of private
property for a use not of a public nature to be void); Sanborn v. Van Duyne, 90 Minn.
215, 223, 96 N.W. 41, 42-43 (1903) (stating neither legislature nor constitution can
authorize the taking of private property for a private use; such authorization would be
unconstitutional and void). The doctrine of public use is equally well-established in
federal courts. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
40. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. Minnesota’s Takings Clause mandates that “[p]rivate
property shall not be taken, destroyed, or damaged for public use without just
compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” Id. Minnesota citizens are similarly
protected under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made
applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
41. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(c) (2002). The petitioner of a cartway must
compensate the landowner for all resulting damages. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(c)
(2002).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/14

6

Kanski: Property Law—Minnesota’s Lake Shore Property Owners Without Road
14 KANSKI - PAGINATED.DOC

2003]

1/13/2004 3:50 PM

LAKE ACCESS AND THE CREATION OF CARTWAYS

731

individuals are capable of utilizing state power to obtain a private road
42
for personal benefit.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
43
constitutionality of cartway statutes.
The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, has specifically validated that the laying of a cartway is a
44
public use for purposes of constitutional legitimacy.
The declared
purpose of a cartway petition is to allow individuals ingress to and egress
45
Minnesota courts fulfill the public use
from their private property.
42. See Brian R. Harris, Note, Private Road or Public Use? The Landlocked
Property Dilemma: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis of Private Road Acts, 80 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 149, 159-60 (2002) (highlighting the argument that private road acts
are unconstitutional). Several states have amended their cartway statutes to refer to the
affected roads as “public” instead of “private,” perhaps to clarify any misconception of
usage. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 6A.4 (2002) (“public way”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 3021 (West 2002) (“public easement”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-07-06 (1943) (as
amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223) (“public road”).
43. SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.07[4][i]. Marinclin v. Urling is the only federal
case that has addressed the constitutionality of private road acts. 262 F. Supp. 733 (D.C.
Pa. 1967), aff’d, 384 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1967). The district court held that a Pennsylvania
statute authorizing the taking of land by eminent domain to establish a private road did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 736. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has established that strong deferential treatment is owed to any legislative
decision regarding what constitutes a public use. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating that as long as there has existed a rational
nexus between the exercise of eminent domain and a public purpose, the Court has never
held a legislative determination unconstitutional).
44. Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 295-96, 135 N.W. 996,
997-98 (1912). Although Minnesota has validated the constitutionality of the cartway,
debate over the use of the state’s power of eminent domain to establish a cartway is
deeply rooted in cartway jurisprudence. Although some states align with Minnesota,
recognizing cartways to be private in name only, several states have held such statutes to
be unconstitutional for failing to serve a public use. See SACKMAN, supra note 37, at §
7.07[4][i]. Many states have solidified the issue by amending their state constitutions to
declare the creation of private roads to be a valid public use. Id. These states include
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
Two recent decisions, however, verify that this vivid constitutional debate is far from
over. See Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 167-69 (Mich. 2001) (deeming
Michigan’s private road act unconstitutional because it authorizes a taking that primarily
benefits a private rather than a public purpose); Township of West Orange v. 769
Assocs., 775 A.2d 657, 662-64 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001), rec’d, 800 A.2d 86 (N.J.
2003) (finding condemnation of a road that will be used almost exclusively by residents
is a private benefit to a private party and not the public).
45. Mueller, 117 Minn. at 294, 135 N.W. at 997. The Mueller court recognized that
the cartway statute may appear to authorize a taking of property for private use. Id. at
295, 135 N.W. at 997. Although case law existed to validate such a view, the court found
that the weight of existing authority supported the view that the only difference between a
private and public road was “one of degree.” Id. The court supported its constitutional
holding with case law of other jurisdictions, including Virginia, Oregon, Massachusetts,
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requirement by recognizing that although the petitioner most directly
benefits, the cartway is public in nature because anyone may lawfully use
46
the road. Under Minnesota jurisprudence, a cartway is characterized as
public or private based on “the extent of the right to use it” not “the
47
extent to which that right is exercised.”
C. An Alternative to Cartway Condemnation
The cartway is a legislative creation aimed to ensure public land
48
Minnesota’s cartway statute allows
access, use, and productivity.
private citizens to use the state’s power of eminent domain, thereby
requiring petitioners to compensate adjacent landowners for all resultant
49
property damage.
Minnesota’s common law affords landlocked
landowners a more stringent, less costly alternative: an implied
50
easement.
The doctrines of common law easements and statutory
cartways utilize overlapping terminology and can create a confusing and
51
Cartway
non-uniform body of law surrounding landlocked property.
statutes are typically enacted to enhance and expand a landowner’s
52
opportunity under the common law.
Although these are two distinct
53
bodies of law, an understanding of the common law forms an essential
basis for analyzing cartway statutes.

and California. Id. at 295, 135 N.W. at 998.
46. Id. at 295, 135 N.W. at 997-98.
47. Id. at 296, 135 N.W. at 998 (quoting Justice Hunt in Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Mont. Union Ry. Co., 41 P. 232, 238 (Mont. 1895)).
48. SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.07[4][i].
49. Id.
50. See infra Part II.C.2.
51. “Few things are as certain as death, taxes, and the legal entanglement that
follows a sale of landlocked real estate.” Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 681 P.2d 1010,
1013 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
52. Minnesota’s cartway statute was “enacted to expand the narrow set of
circumstances under which a party could, at common law, seek a way of necessity.”
Ullrich v. Newburg Township Bd., No. C1-02-565, 2002 WL 31553853, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 2002).
53. See In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway, 644 N.W.2d 495, 498
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003) [hereinafter Daniel I]
(recognizing in dicta that although they may be similar, the common law easement by
necessity is not dispositive of statutory cartway issues).
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54

The easement is a common law creation, based on the theory that
land conveyances inherently include all that is necessary for the
55
Its doctrinal roots are
beneficial use and enjoyment of the land.
56
traceable as far back as the thirteenth century.
The doctrine was
founded upon two theoretical justifications: (1) a public policy favoring
57
land utilization and (2) effecting the intent of private parties. Society
58
does not desire property rendered unproductive for lack of access.
Consequently, a presumption naturally arises out of conveyances that
59
An
parties intend land to be accessible and available for full use.
easement can typically be implied based on two distinct theories: a
60
61
continued prior use or necessity. It is primarily the latter, however,
that has always been submerged in controversy.
An implied easement of necessity traditionally requires four
elements: (1) a unified title of both parcels of land prior to severance, (2)
subsequent severance of title, (3) a necessity that existed at the time of
62
the severance, and (4) that the necessity has continued to persist. It is
the degree of necessity that has rendered courts divided throughout the
63
While the majority of courts require only a showing of
years.
reasonable necessity, several jurisdictions require a showing of strict or
64
absolute necessity. Strict necessity means that whenever an alternative
means of access exists, even though substantially more difficult or

54. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 1 (2002) (defining
an easement as a right or privilege of an owner of one parcel of land to use a second
parcel of land belonging to another).
55. Id. at § 23.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.15, cmt. a (2000). A maxim
from the time of Edward I (1239-1307) recognized that grants must include all that
without which, the grant could not be or exist. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Under this theory, necessity is based on the existence and extent of land use
contemplated by the parties at the time of severance. HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL
JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, § 794 (3d ed. 2002).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.12 (2000).
61. See id. at § 2.15.
62. Hunter C. Carroll, Property-Easements by Necessity: What Level of Necessity Is
Required?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 475, 475 (1995).
63. Id. at 476.
64. Id. at 477-78 (giving examples of jurisdictions that follow doctrines of
reasonable and strict necessity, respectively, as well as those that have enacted statutory
easements of necessity).
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65

expensive, an easement will be denied. Both views find support in
66
While a requirement of reasonableness promotes land
public policy.
utilization, a requirement of strictness safeguards landowners from those
67
who seek to unlawfully gain entrance and use of their property.
Regardless of the degree required, however, the mere inconvenience of
68
existent access will rarely suffice.
2. Minnesota’s Unique Creation
Minnesota’s common law easement has treaded in murky waters
since it was first recognized in 1934 (years after the cartway statute had
69
70
been established). In Romanchuk v. Plotkin, the Minnesota Supreme
Court identified three essential characteristics in the creation of an
implied easement where unity of ownership is severed: (1) separation of
title, (2) a continued and apparent use intended to be permanent in
nature, and (3) that the use is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the
71
land.
Failing to clearly distinguish between easements by necessity
72
and prior use by requiring elements of each, Minnesota courts have
created an implied easement that is susceptible to continual muddied
73
analysis.
Although this may at first appear to be an abnormally difficult
standard to meet, the Romanchuk court went on to indicate flexibility by
74
stating that not all three elements are necessary.
The presence or
65. See id. at 477.
66. See id. at 476-77.
67. See id.
68. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 42 (2002).
69. See supra Part II.A.
70. 215 Minn. 156, 9 N.W.2d 421 (1943) (establishing Minnesota’s recognition of
easements by necessity).
71. Id. at 160-61, 9 N.W.2d at 424.
72. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recognized its use of “easements by
implication” and “easements by necessity” interchangeably. Bode v. Bode, 494 N.W.2d
301, 304 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
73. Although the Bode court attempted to distinguish easements by necessity,
relying on Powell’s The Law of Real Property, the court subsequently limited the
distinction to parties to the severing transaction. Id. at 303-04 n.1 (citing 3 Richard R.
Powell, The Law of Real Property § 407 (1992)); Lake George Park, L.L.C. v. IBM MidAm. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
This limitation, however, did not clarify the doctrinal confusion existing in Minnesota’s
implied easement by necessity. Minnesota courts continue to engage in confusing
analysis of both prior use and necessity. See, e.g., id. at 465 (applying the Romanchuk
and Olson decisions). While prior use is merely an indicia of intent, necessity is required.
Id.
74. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 164, 9 N.W.2d at 426.
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75

absence of a characteristic is not to be deemed conclusive.
The
76
In Olson v.
necessity requirement, however, must always be met.
Mullen, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed its creative and
discretional approach to implying easements and indicated a number of
77
non-exhaustive factors to be taken into consideration.
In Romanchuk, Minnesota aligned itself with the majority of
jurisdictions that require the use to be only that which is “reasonably
78
necessary or convenient to the beneficial enjoyment of the property.”
Although convenience alone is not sufficient, difficulty and expense are
79
factors to be considered in identifying a use that is “reasonable.”
Minnesota case law has explicitly repudiated any idea of indispensable
80
use or absolute necessity.
III. THE DANIEL DECISION
A. Facts
Donald Schoch (“Schoch”) owns lakeshore property on Lake
81
Vermillion, Minnesota. His property has been in the Schoch family for
82
more than eighty-five years.
In 1995, Thomas Daniel (“Daniel”)
purchased a parcel of lakefront property adjacent to Schoch’s family

75. Id. The court viewed any rules regarding implied easements as mere rules of
construction, useful only to aid in ascertaining the intent of the parties and the scope of
the conveyance. Id. at 164-65, 9 N.W.2d at 426. The supreme court therefore left open
“the scope and effect of the characteristics mentioned in the process of construction.” Id.
at 165, 9 N.W.2d at 426.
76. Olson v. Mullen, 244 Minn. 31, 40, 68 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1955). The necessity
must also have existed at the time of the severance. Id. at 41, 68 N.W.2d at 647.
77. See id. at 40, 68 N.W.2d at 647. The court used the approach of the
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, § 476 (1944). Id.
78. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163, 9 N.W.2d at 425-26 (recognizing an authority
split on the requisite “necessity” and adopting the majority view of “reasonable”). For a
historic look at the origins of the “necessity” debate, see Tooth v. Bryce, 25 A. 182 (N.J.
Ch. 1892).
79. Clark v. Galaxy Apartments, 427 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding a lack of reasonable necessity where no “geographical constraints” existed and
no evidence indicated that construction of a driveway would be either “difficult or
expensive”).
80. See Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163-64, 9 N.W.2d at 426 (“necessary” does not
equate with indispensable and is not an “absolute” necessity).
81. Appellant’s Brief at 2, Schoch v. St. Louis County, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn.
2002) (No. CX-01-1820).
82. Id. at 2-3.
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83

property. Daniel was aware at purchase that the property’s only access
84
was via Lake Vermillion and no road access existed. Daniel apparently
utilized Lake Vermillion to access his property without complaint for
85
four years.
It was not until 1999, when a severe windstorm caused
significant tree damage to Daniel’s property, that Daniel explored
86
potential possibilities to obtain road access.
Schoch’s property had suffered similar tree damage, and Schoch
had constructed a road on his own property in order to access the downed
87
trees and debris. When Daniel contacted Schoch to discuss extending
the road to Daniel’s property to allow similar tree removal, Schoch
88
Daniel then petitioned the St. Louis County Board of
refused.
89
Commissioners to grant a cartway across Schoch’s land.
The board
granted Daniel the cartway, pursuant to Minnesota’s cartway statute,
finding he did not have access to his property except over the land of
90
others. The board ordered 3.90 acres of Schoch’s property to be taken
for purposes of the cartway and calculated Schoch’s damages to be
91
$18,022.
B. Procedural History
92

Schoch appealed the board’s decision to the district court.

The

83. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544.
84. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at
11). The property’s purchase price likely reflected limited access. Id. (citing the Tr. of
Summ. J. at 5).
85. See Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Daniel petitioned the board pursuant to the Minnesota cartway statute. See
MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd. 2(a) (2002).
90. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
(DNR), however, opposed the cartway on the basis that it would have crossed wetlands.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3-4. The Minnesota DNR offered Daniel the use of
its winter logging roads in order to facilitate removal of the blow-down timber. Id. at 4.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court had already established that permissive access
does not constitute access within the meaning of the cartway statute. See Kroyer v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 202 Minn. 41, 43, 277 N.W. 234, 235 (1938) (holding that where access
to a public road is only permissive in nature, access does not exist for cartway purposes
due to a lack of a permanent, legal right of use).
91. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at app. 3 (board’s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, and Order). Under Minnesota’s cartway statute, damages would have been
paid by Daniel. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (2002).
92. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at app. 5 (District Court’s Order and
Judgment).
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Minnesota district court granted summary judgment to St. Louis County,
93
affirming the board’s decision. Unable to find any case law or statute
indicative of legislative intent that lake access warrants denial of a
cartway petition, the district court held that the board did not abuse its
94
legislative discretion in granting the petition.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant
95
of summary judgment. The parties did not dispute that Daniel could
96
The only issue to be
access his property over Lake Vermillion.
resolved was the interpretation of the word “access” as used in the
97
cartway statute.
To interpret the ambiguous term “access,” the
appellate court considered the mischief to be remedied by the cartway
98
statute, as well as its desired objective. The court also considered the
consequences of particular interpretations in order to avoid attaining an
99
Recognizing that lake access may likely satisfy
unreasonable result.
legislative intent in light of the mischief to be remedied and the statutory
objective, the appellate court ruled out lake access as valid on the basis
100
that not allowing road access would be unreasonable.
The court
reasoned that lake access is inadequate due to the inherent seasonality of
101
lakes and the inevitable “vicissitudes of the Minnesota climate.”
93. Id. at app. 6.
94. Id. at app. 7-10 (District Court’s Memorandum Opinion).
95. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d 495. The appellate court noted that no controlling
authority existed and that the ambiguous term “access” was to be construed pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 645.16 (2000). Id. at 497.
96. Id.
97. Id. Application of a statute to undisputed facts is purely a question of law. Id.
The court, therefore, disregarded Schoch’s reliance on the Roemer decision. Id. at 498.
The Roemer decision contemplated access where the owner already had a means of
ingress and egress where an easement by necessity exists. Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors,
283 Minn. 288, 291, 167 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1969). However, Roemer was held not to
control due to the court’s interpretation that water access did not constitute access, and
thus a valid alternative did not exist for Daniel. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 498.
98. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 497.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id. The seasonality of Minnesota’s waterways, however, has long been
incorporated into commercial usage. See WATER RES. COORDINATING COMM., MINN.
STATE PLANNING AGENCY, MINN. WATER AND RELATED LAND RES., FIRST ASSESSMENT,
(1970) [hereinafter WATER LAND RESOURCES] (analyzing the past and predicting the
future of the commercial uses of Minnesota’s waterway navigation). The court’s
reasoning is in line with other courts that have deemed that navigable water is not
acceptable as access where it freezes and thus can not be navigated for several months of
the year. See, e.g., Rodal v. Crawford, 261 N.W. 260, 263 (Mich. 1935) (stating in dicta
that water access that is otherwise navigable but frozen for several months a year cannot
constitute valid access).
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Though not controlling, the appellate court relied heavily on the
decision in State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood to support its
102
interpretation of the cartway statute.
In Rose, the petitioner was
entitled to a cartway where two of petitioner’s three lots were not
103
It was impracticable
accessible via a public road due to a muddy lake.
104
to build a road to cross the lake and join the lots.
The court likened
the Rose scenario to Daniel’s debacle, in that the building of a road
105
across the lake was impracticable, thus entitling Daniel to a cartway.
106
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s
assertion that the sole issue was the correct statutory interpretation of the
107
Statutory interpretation
term “access” as used in the cartway statute.
108
In conclusory
must be aimed at effecting the intent of the legislature.
fashion, the court deemed any interpretation rendering water access as
109
invalid would be improper in light of legislative intent.
The court
reasoned that the “no access” language first appeared in the cartway
statute in 1913, at which time travel over navigable waterways was not
110
only common, but often the best mode of transportation.
St. Louis County argued that only land access was contemplated by
111
the legislature due to the statute being within a town road statute.

102. State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N.W.2d 345
(1945).
103. Id. at 513-14, 20 N.W.2d at 347-48.
104. Id. at 513-14, 20 N.W.2d at 348.
105. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 498.
106. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 545.
107. Id. Application of statutory language to undisputed facts is a conclusion of law,
reviewable de novo on appeal. Id.
108. Id. In ascertaining legislative intent, a court may consider:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under which
it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained,
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar
subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the
contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and administrative
interpretations of the statute.
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002).
109. Daniel II, 656 N.W. 2d at 545.
110. Id. The court further recognized that numerous other properties on Lake
Vermillion had been accessed solely by water for more than a century. Id. at 546.
111. Id.
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However, the supreme court promptly refuted any such argument.
The location of the statute as part of a “roads” statute was deemed to be
non-determinative of whether or not “access” was intended to include
113
both land and water access.
The court then went on to find all
Minnesota case law regarding cartways as inapposite on the interpretive
114
issue.
The appellate court’s reliance on the Rose decision was deemed
115
The supreme court found the issue involved in Rose to be
erroneous.
distinctly different. In Rose, the issue of whether property could be
116
accessed by lake was never considered.
The Rose decision was
limited to whether the nature of the lake on plaintiff’s property prevented
land-based travel across the property to a section that did have access to
117
a public road.
The board’s finding that Daniel had no access to his
property was irreconcilable with the supreme court’s interpretation of the
118
statute.
The court of appeals was thus reversed and the case remanded
119
The Daniel
to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Schoch.
decision requires that ingress and egress via navigable waters must be
120
taken into consideration when determining cartway eligibility.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DANIEL DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court rightfully limited the scope of its
121
Although its ascertainment
decision to ascertaining legislative intent.
122
of that intent was of a conclusory nature, it is supported by history.
It
is interesting, however, that the Daniel decision introduces Minnesota to
overtones of “strict” access requirements, clearly contradicting the

112. Id.
113. Id. The county had premised its reasoning that lake access is inconsistent with
the “overall intention of the statute.” Id. at 545. Therefore, the court could have more
directly refuted the county’s argument on the basis that the “letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002).
114. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546. See also Christopherson v. Fillmore Township,
583 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no Minnesota authority that defined
“access” for purposes of statutory construction).
115. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546.
116. See Rose, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N.W.2d 345.
117. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546.
118. Id.
119. Id. There was no need for further factual findings because it was never disputed
that Daniel had access to his property using Lake Vermillion. Id.
120. Id. at 545.
121. See infra Part IV.A.1.
122. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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common law doctrine of “reasonableness” that facilitates land access.

123

A. Correct Decision . . . Correct Interpretation
1. A Correct Decision
Establishment of a statutory cartway by a town board is a quasi124
and is therefore subject only to narrow judicial
legislative action
125
review.
Accordingly, Minnesota courts afford great deference to
126
A town or county board’s
board determinations of cartway petitions.
decision may be reversed only if it is clearly against the evidence, based
on an erroneous theory of law, or if the board acts arbitrarily,
127
capriciously, or contrary to public interest.
The Daniel court’s
reversal of the St. Louis County Board’s decision is justified on the basis
that the board’s misinterpretation of “access” resulted in an application
128
of an erroneous theory of law.
Courts cannot disregard specific statutory language in order to attain
129
a statute’s alleged overall “spirit.”
Therefore, the supreme court
correctly limited its interpretation analysis to the precise “no access”
130
The court rightfully looked to the historical
language in dispute.
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
125. Id. at 595 (“When judicially reviewing a legislative determination, the scope of
review must necessarily be narrow” (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Vill. of New Hope, 300
Minn. 326, 333, 220 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1974)). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determining whether th[e] power [of eminent
domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”). The level
of review afforded legislative decisions is often referred to as “rational basis.” See Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (stating that a taking has never violated
the public use requirement where it was “rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose”) (emphasis added).
126. Courts will even affirm when they would have reached a different conclusion
themselves. Horton, 624 N.W.2d at 595.
127. Id.. See also Lafayette Land Co. v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 305 Minn. 461, 463,
234 N.W.2d 804, 805 (1975) (recognizing an established rule that decisions to open
streets are vested solely in the legislative discretion of municipalities); Lieser v. Town of
St. Martin, 255 Minn. 153, 158, 96 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1959) (recognizing town boards act in a
legislative capacity when considering town road petitions); Rask v. Town Bd. of
Hendrum, 173 Minn. 572, 574, 218 N.W. 115, 116 (1928) (indicating the question of
whether a cartway should be established is “one of policy, legislative in its nature”)
(citation omitted).
128. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546.
129. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002) (stating that the “letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit”).
130. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 545-46.
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context underlying the statute’s 1913 amendment to ascertain legislative
131
Daniel’s particularly unfortunate situation was appropriately
intent.
not determinative on the court’s decision; statutory interpretation is to
132
prioritize public interest over the interest of private citizens.
The court appropriately refrained from altering the cartway statute
133
and limited itself to statutory interpretation.
Although lake access
may appear inadequate and inconvenient in light of today’s modern
modes of transportation, the court’s holding was the only proper
disposition of the case. Statutory change must originate in the legislature
134
itself.
In order to accommodate the transportation needs of today’s
society, the Minnesota legislature has the sole capacity to either amend
the cartway statute or statutorily define “access” in order to allow
135
cartways to be condemned where land is water accessible.
2. A Correct Interpretation
The Minnesota Supreme Court had minimal documentation to assist
in ascertaining the intent of Minnesota’s 38th legislature (1913). What is
documented is that the disputed “access” language was referred to the
136
Committee on Roads and Bridges by the House of Representatives.
However, no committee reports are available today. Although multiple
amendments to the bill were considered prior to passage, none was in
137
reference to the disputed “access” language.
A brief glance at

131. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(b) (2002).
132. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2002) (stating a presumption in favor of the
public interest over private interest). However, promoting lake access cannot entirely be
said to be against the interest of the Minnesota public. Legislative assessments have
indicated a strong Minnesota public benefit that arises out of not only commercial
navigation but also recreational uses of navigable waterways. WATER LAND RESOURCES,
supra note 101, at 280. Developing water resources for navigation greatly contributes to
Minnesota’s economic development and social well-being. Id. For many Minnesotans
the motorboat has become a necessity; motor-boating, waterskiing, and canoeing have all
boomed during the last half-century. LASS, supra note 1, at 27.
133. “The people may change the law of the United States but the Court cannot do
so. The Court can only interpret the law.” United States. v. Perko, 133 F. Supp. 564, 570
(D. Minn. 1955).
134. “If there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature, for
the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently
overlooks.” Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963)
(citations omitted).
135. See id.
136. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF MINNESOTA, 371 (1913).
137. See id. at 562-71 and JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF
MINNESOTA, 1063-66, 1111, 1135-42 (1913).
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Minnesota history compensates the lack of legislative history and clearly
supports the supreme court’s interpretation of the elusive term “access.”
Minnesota’s lakes are a current source of pride for both rural and
138
urban residents.
This pride is not a recent phenomenon; it is deeply
139
The state’s abundant
entrenched throughout Minnesota’s history.
water highways have decisively influenced Minnesota’s diplomatic and
140
legal architecture.
The Legislative Manual of 1913 boasted an
existent pride in Minnesota’s water resources that first resounded when
141
the territory was named after the “Minisota” river.
The manual
proudly declared that “few states are so well watered as Minnesota” and
that Minnesota’s lakes were more varied and numerous than any other
142
state’s.
Waterway pride, however, never foreclosed any opportunities
for the state to keep up with the nation’s transportation developments.
An analysis of the early development in transportation, both in
Minnesota and on the national level, is necessary to comprehend the
legislature’s use of the word “access” in 1913. On the national level, the
143
first American gasoline-powered automobile was designed in 1893.
By 1900 there were only approximately 8000 automobiles throughout the
144
United States, primarily possessed by the rich.
The industry was
revolutionized, however, in 1903 when Henry Ford established the Ford
145
Motor Co. of Detroit, Michigan.
Five years later, Ford introduced the
146
Yet it wasn’t until 1913
American public to the inexpensive Model T.
that Ford’s foresight and pragmatic approach resulted in the first
147
automobile assembly line.
The efficiency of the assembly line,
138. TESTER, supra note 8, at 197. Minnesotans naturally speak of the state’s
thousands of lakes when asked about its characteristic geographic features. BLEGEN,
supra note 9, at 12-13.
139. Minnesota’s geographic factors have always been interwoven with its human
story. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 4.
140. Id. at 7. Transportation at statehood (in the 1850s) underwent a revolution;
innovations included expanding the use of canals, steamboats, roads, and railroads. Id. at
180.
141. SCHMAHL, supra note 18, at 198.
142. Id. at 199. This statement holds true today. Minnesota measures 84,068 square
miles, with water constituting 4,059 of those miles. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 6. This is
greater than any other state. Id.
143. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HERITAGE: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 291
(Michael Sagalyn, ed., Penguin Putnam, Inc. 1998). Charles and Frank Duryea designed
the vehicle in Springfield, Massachusetts. Id.
144. ALLEN WEINSTEIN & DAVID RUBEL, THE STORY OF AMERICA: FREEDOM AND
CRISIS FROM SETTLEMENT TO SUPERPOWER 469 (DK Publishing, Inc. 2002).
145. Id.
146. BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 387. In 1908, the Model T sold for $845. Id.
147. WEINSTEIN & RUBEL, supra note 144, at 469.
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coupled with Ford’s allowance of installment plans, fueled the industry’s
148
The subsequent explosion in automobile ownership
growth.
149
influenced Americans both economically and socially.
As splendid as its waterways were, Minnesotans were early to
150
Even as a territory,
identify the paramount need for good roads.
strong public policy recognized land access as a priority in territorial
151
expansion.
The territorial legislature was thus quick to authorize and
develop a needed network of roads, quickly trodden upon by buggies,
152
carriages, and stagecoaches.
In Minnesota, 1913 was a year engulfed
153
Minnesotans were increasingly
in transportation transitions.
recognizing and appreciating the value of reliable land-based
154
transportation.
Minnesotans, however, were only first introduced to the automobile
155
In 1898, Minnesota’s constitution was
revolution in the late 1890s.
amended to create a highway commission and state tax that were
156
designed to aid road development.
Yet by 1902, only twelve cars
157
Fascination with the industry prompted its
could be found in the state.
rapid growth; by 1909, 7000 automobiles and 4000 motorcycles had
158
been licensed in the state.
Such exponential growth was influential in
148. Id. at 470. Within three years of the assembly line’s introduction, Ford was able
to lower the Model T’s price to $360 and increase sales from 10,607 to 730,041 vehicles
per year. Id.
149. Id. By 1926, Ford was producing a Model T every ten seconds. BRINKLEY,
supra note 143, at 387.
150. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 192.
151. Id. Minnesotans began to question “[h]ow public lands could be sold ‘if the
immigrant[s] cannot reach them?’ ” Id.
152. Id. at 192-93.
153. The automobile industry was not the only source of transition. The lumber
industry, dependent on the state’s abundant navigable rivers, reached its high point in
1900, when Minnesota produced more than 2 billion board feet and was ranked third
nationally for lumber production. LASS, supra note 1, at 180. However, Minnesota’s
lumber production declined gradually by 1914, it yielded only half of what it had in 1905.
BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 329. Carl Wickman, an enterprising business pioneer, left his
job in 1913 to buy the Hupmobile, a seven-passenger vehicle, to transport miners.
STEPHEN GEORGE, ENTERPRISING MINNESOTANS: 150 YEARS OF BUSINESS PIONEERS 90
(University of Minnesota Press 2003). With gasoline selling for 4 cents a gallon, he
charged 15 cents for a one-way trip and became the founder of Minnesota’s bus industry.
Id.
154. In 1913 Minnesota inaugurated “Good Roads Day” to be the third Tuesday of
every June. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 465.
155. Id. at 463.
156. Id. at 464. However, the commission was not set into motion until 1905. Id.
157. Id. at 463. The speed limit in 1902 was ten miles per hour. Id. at 463-64.
158. Id. at 464. Minnesota’s transportation developments mirrored those of the
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159

pressuring the state for the development of a sound road system.
Regardless of its rapid growth, clearly in 1913 the phenomenon of
vehicular transportation had not yet trumped the state’s dependence on
160
navigable waters.
Progress in the road-building industry dwindled
161
Minnesota’s licensing act was not passed until
through World War I.
162
163
1908; the highway department was first authorized only in 1917.
From a historical point of view, the common usage of “access” in 1913
164
would clearly not have excluded water access.
B. Statutory Dissension
Discord abounds throughout the nation as states grant statutory
cartways based on varying degrees of necessity. The majority of states
have deemed cartways necessary whenever practicable or reasonable
165
under the circumstances.
Access must be of a level that allows
166
This flows from the idea that access need
effective use of the land.
not be of an absolute or indispensable character to warrant
167
recognition.
Instead, necessity is inherently interwoven with the
nation. Four thousand cars, produced by a dozen companies, could be found throughout
the United States in 1900. Id. at 463. Within ten years, production skyrocketed to
181,000 cars being produced by sixty-nine companies. Id.
159. See id. at 464 (stating cars contributed to the pressures in the state for good
roads but interest in improving rough roads was present before the introduction of the
automobile).
160. In the early 1900s the automobile was considered to be nothing more than a
“curiosity,” “a contrivance for the rich,” and a “noisy phenomenon that nobody quite
knew how to control.” Id.
161. Id. at 465.
162. Id. at 464.
163. Id. at 465.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subd. 1 (2002) (requiring words to be construed to
their common and approved usage).
165. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1202 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-66-401
(Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-40 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 7-701
(Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-117 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-7-201 (2002)
amended by 2003 Miss. Laws 535; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-68 (2002); 36 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.24.010 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-9101 (Michie 2002) amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 9. To add to the confusion,
Missouri specifies “strict necessity” in the statute, but has interpreted “strict” as meaning
the absence of a “reasonable and practical” way. See MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002);
Anderson v. Mantel, 49 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting § 228.342).
166. Sorenson v. Czinger, 852 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted).
167. See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 399 P.2d 330, 335 (Wash. 1965) (interpreting
the necessity language of Washington’s cartway statute).
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168

concept of public use and embraces the public’s right to access.
This
“reasonable” viewpoint facilitates the very purpose of cartway legislation
169
by avoiding the rendering of land useless
and furthering the public
170
A landowner should be entitled to
policy behind land accessibility.
the full enjoyment of his property, especially if the enjoyment would
make useful and valuable that which otherwise would be useless or
171
valueless.
However, whenever a cartway is laid under the pretext of a
landowner’s right of access, it is done in derogation of the adjoining
172
landowner’s rights.
Recognition of this injustice may explain why an
extreme minority of courts have adopted a very narrow view on when
173
cartways are truly “necessary.”
It is within this category, however,
that the Daniel decision mandates future interpretations of the cartway
statute by Minnesota courts. The courts have previously afforded great
174
deference to board determinations regarding cartway petitions.
This
deference has been illustrated by Minnesota courts upholding board
168. Id.
169. See Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Iowa 2000) (citing In re Luloff,
512 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing it is socially desirable to make
landlocked property useable)).
170. Moore v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 95 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind. 1950).
171. See Miss. Power Co. v. Fairchild, 791 So. 2d 262, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. (2001)
(citing Warwick v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 246 So. 2d 525, 528 (Miss.
1971) (recognizing that without access a portion of land would be rendered of little use or
value)).
172. This has resulted in several courts strictly construing cartway statutes in order
prevent undue injustice to the adjoining landowners. See, e.g., Brown v. Glass, 50 S.E.2d
912, 912-13 (N.C. 1948) (holding that the statutory requirements are strict conditions
precedent to the laying of a statutory cartway); Olivo v. Rasmussen, 738 P.2d 333, 335
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that decisions between land condemnation and
landlocked property boils down to choosing the “lesser of the two evils”).
173. Bowles v. Chapman, 175 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tenn. 1943) (quoting 17 AM. JUR.
Easements § 50) (requiring a showing of absolute necessity, and not mere inconvenience,
in applying the common law doctrine of easement of necessity). Some statutes have
alleviated the subjective nature of this inquiry by specifying in the statute prerequisites of
specific land use to allow a cartway. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2003) (right
exists for land being used as a dwelling, agricultural, timber, or stock raising purpose);
IDAHO CODE § 7-701 (Michie 2003) (eminent domain authorized to lay byroads leading
from highway to a residence or farm); IND. CODE § 32-23-3-1 (2003) (applying only when
land is isolated due to a stream straightening, ditch construction, or erection of a dam);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3022 (West 2003) (requiring land must be cultivated in
order to be entitled to a “public easement”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 247.211 (2003)
(establishing roads to residences or lake resort homes where lands have been platted and
duly recorded); N.Y. REAL PROP. § 335(a) (McKinney 2002) (applying to lots on
subdivision maps filed in the county clerk’s office).
174. See supra Part IV.A.1.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 14
14 KANSKI - PAGINATED.DOC

746

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1/13/2004 3:50 PM

[Vol. 30:2
175

decisions that require both aspects of “strict” access necessity as well
as board decisions requiring only access that is “reasonable or
176
practical.”
177
At
Daniel’s physical access to his property was never disputed.
dispute was whether the existent lake access constituted a viable means
178
of access under the cartway statute.
Under the circumstances,
however, Daniel’s predicament rendered physical lake access
inconvenient in light of his need to remove large amounts of fallen
timber. Not allowing Daniel road access to his property entitles Daniel
only to a physical means of access that is neither reasonable nor
practicable. The supreme court’s decision has thus removed a degree of
deference formerly afforded board determinations.
Future board
decisions will necessarily replace circumstantial consideration with a
mandated view that water access is a viable and appropriate means of
property access, thereby precluding a cartway.
C. Prospective Amendment
The Minnesota legislature could resolve future land “access”
disputes arising under the cartway statute by following the lead of
several other states. First, several states’ cartway statutes have
specifically resolved the Daniel issue by utilizing language that specifies
a cartway is justified when property is completely surrounded by either
175. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has previously affirmed town board decisions
denying cartway petitions notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the access situation
presented. See Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (deeming access via horse, snowmobile, and all-terrain vehicles sufficient); In re
the Petition of Wood for the Establishment of a Township Cartway, No. CX-98-852,
1996 WL 70101, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1996) (requiring a property owner to
cross a stream with farm equipment or construct a bridge to access forty acres of property
without road access). Contra Harris v. Gray, 188 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945)
(finding it was not reasonable or practicable to expect a property owner to cross a river
with farming machinery in order to access property).
176. Ullrich v. Newburg Township Bd., No. C1-02-565, 2003 WL 31553853, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) (finding that where a river was deemed impassable due
to its high banks and fast-flowing water, no reasonable access existed for purposes of
laying a cartway). This stance is supported by other jurisdictions. Even though access to
the property is not absolutely cut off, it fails to afford the landowner beneficial enjoyment
of his property. Miss. Power Co. v. Fairchild, 791 So. 2d 262, 266 (holding that where
bridge construction is cost prohibitive it renders access unreasonable and supporting its
stance with Mississippi and Connecticut case law). See also Alpaugh v. Moore, 568
So. 2d 291, 295 (Miss. 1990) (recognizing the inherent unreasonableness in requiring
property owners to build bridges in order to access their land).
177. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544.
178. Id. at 544-45.
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179

the property of another or water.
These statutes inherently deem water
180
access, on its own, to be insufficient.
A further amendment would be to remove any linguistic ambiguity
by specifying whether the statute ensures access to property or access to
a road. Although not addressed by the supreme court, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals interpreted the statute by looking at the apparent
181
mischief it was to remedy.
In so doing, it stated that the mischief was
the situation where a landowner “has no way to reach a public road from
182
his property.”
The statute, however, reads: “the owner of a tract of
183
land . . . who has no access thereto except over the land of others.”
This linguistic ambiguity, whether the statute specifically regards access
to a public road or access to property, only creates additional interpretive
184
problems that could be easily clarified by more precise language.
Many cartway statutes have resolved any such ambiguity by specifying
185
“access to a road” and not “access to property.”
Language
guaranteeing road access, instead of property access, would also best
186
mirror the original cartway statute of the Minnesota Territory.
Daniel knowingly purchased lakeshore property with limited
187
access.
Minnesota’s cartway statute, however, does not condition the
granting of cartways on whether the petitioner created the need for
188
access.
Some states, however, could have resolved the Daniel issue
solely on the basis that Daniel created his own predicament by
179. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-66-401 (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
68.117; NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-17-13 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-26-815 (Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161).
180. See supra note 179. However, the Arkansas statute reads slightly differently in
that it allows access to navigable watercourses, where desired. See ARK. CODE ANN. §
27-66-401 (Michie 2002).
181. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 497.
182. Id.
183. MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd.2(a) (2002).
184. See infra Part IV.B.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350
(Banks-Baldwin 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-07-06
(2002) (amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223); OR. REV. STAT. § 376.155 (2002); 36 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31-22-1 (Michie 2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-14-101 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 126-815 (Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161).
186. “Any person who shall be so located that his land has no connection with any
public road, or cartway . . . may apply to the board . . . [for a cartway] to some convenient
public road.” REVISED MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851).
187. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at
11).
188. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002).
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purchasing property he knew to have lake-only access.
Statutes exist
that specifically negate any cartway option where a landowner either
purchases property with knowledge that no access exists or knowingly
190
eliminates the access he has.
Other state courts have similarly
interpreted cartway statutes to render them inapplicable where a
191
landowner voluntarily creates his predicament.
Any argument that
statutory cartway condemnation unjustly increases property values
allowing subsequent sales yielding higher prices is negated by the
192
statutory requirement that the petitioner pay for all resultant damages.
Few courts have specifically addressed the situation of a landowner
193
attempting to remove timber from his private property over a lake.
However, several courts have addressed the issue of lake access for
194
purposes of statutory cartways.
Where property borders navigable
195
As in
waters, clearly access to the property exists in some form.
Daniel, the question then becomes whether the navigable waters afford
reasonable access within the boundaries of the statutory grant of
196
authority.
Bodies of water have provided transportation means and prompted
189. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at
11).
190. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); OR. REV.
STAT. § 376.155 (2002).
191. See Cont’l Enters., Inc. v. Cain, 387 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (stating
that where subsequent owners purchase land without access there can be no taking as to
the subsequent owner); Graff v. Scanlan, 673 A.2d 1028, 1033 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)
(finding that landowners are precluded from common law easements by necessity where
they have voluntarily created their own predicament).
192. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002). See also Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 283
Minn. 288, 291-92, 167 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1969) (recognizing in dicta a fear that
construing the statute to allow alternative road access could lead to potential abuse of
spending public money on roads where one should privately negotiate the value and pay
damages).
193. The majority of opinions that have dealt with timber removal and road access
have been in the context of the logging industry, often denying road access where a
navigable stream was available to float the logs. See, e.g., Taylor v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper
Co., 137 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1964); State v. Superior Court, 190 P. 234 (Wash. 1920).
194. See, e.g., Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(holding that where property was only accessible via navigable water, the landowner was
entitled to a cartway due to water access being impracticable); In re Hall v. Twin Caney
Watershed Joint Dist. No. 34, 604 P.2d 63, 65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that in
order to preclude property access, the bordering water must be so extensive as to deprive
any reasonable passage over it).
195. Int’l Paper Realty Corp. v. Miller, 341 S.E.2d 445, 446 (Ga. 1986) (establishing
that where property is accessible only by navigable waters a prima facie case has been
established that there is no reasonable access for purposes of statutory construction).
196. Id.
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197

land development for centuries.
However, the development of
extensive land transportation systems has rendered means of ingress and
198
egress by water less necessary and less desirable.
In this day and age,
navigable bodies of water are seldom considered reasonable as a sole
199
200
Several states have taken this stance.
Some
means of traveling.
courts have gone so far as to specifically interpret a cartway statute as
201
being outdated in light of modern travel by motor vehicle.
D. Navigable Water & Common Law “Necessity”
Neither geography nor humankind is static; both operate as
202
Minnesota’s stagnant statutory constructions
architects of change.
aside, implied easement jurisprudence has been gradually sculpted to
203
As previously stated, the only
keep apace with modern transportation.
potential source of change in the cartway statute is the Minnesota
204
legislature.
However, an overview of common law trends may be
indicative of future legislative reaction to the Daniel decision.
The Minnesota courts have not yet considered the reasonableness of
water access for purposes of common law implied easements.
Regardless, the Daniel decision is difficult to square with Minnesota’s
205
long-standing standard of “reasonableness.”
Since its doctrinal
inception, the cartway’s common law counterpart has adopted the view
197. Redman, 180 So. 2d at 684.
198. Id.
199. Int’l Paper, 341 S.E.2d at 446 (reasoning that society is better off as a whole by
deeming water access as unreasonable access).
200. See, e.g., Redman, 180 So. 2d at 684 (stating that although practicable a century
ago, today access to land by boat is unreasonable); Hancock v. Henderson, 202 A.2d 599,
602 (Md. 1964) (acknowledging sound social policy reasons in allowing easements
where land borders on navigable water); Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) (noting a trend since the 1920s toward liberally granting
easements despite water access); Cookston v. Box, 160 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959) (stating in dicta that water access does not facilitate transportation to allow the
carrying on of the “ordinary and necessary activities of life from and to the land”); see
also E. L. Kellett, Annotation, Easements: Way by Necessity Where Property Is
Accessible by Navigable Water, 9 A.L.R.3D 600 § 3 (1966).
201. See, e.g., Attaway v. Davis, 707 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1986) (recognizing that
statutory language deeming access by water to be sufficient was adopted more than a
century ago, in 1871, and that today access by boat would not be reasonable).
202. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 13.
203. See Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1160 n.4 (Me. 1993) (acknowledging that
the common law easement must be reexamined based on the “ascendancy of the
automobile”).
204. See supra Part IV.A.1.
205. Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 215 Minn. 156, 163, 9 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1943).
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that an easement should be implied whenever “convenient to the
206
An absolute or indispensable
beneficial enjoyment of the property.”
207
need need not be shown.
Although Minnesota courts have not addressed common law
208
“necessity” regarding navigable water, several jurisdictions have.
Availability, convenience, popularity, and expense have been factors in
the development of both transportation and the judicial decisions
209
analyzing what constitutes reasonable land access.
Clearly modes of
transportation such as helicopters and planes truly render the present-day
210
concept of “no access” to require steep conditions.
However, courts
have implied easements by necessity in furtherance of the public policy
goal of full and productive land use.
A debate regarding the requisite degree of “necessity” continues to
211
persist.
Difficulty in ascertaining a subjective degree of “necessity” is
212
one of the very reasons many states have enacted cartway statutes.
A
1966 survey of cases identified that out of ten cases that deemed water
213
Interestingly,
access as sufficient, only two were decided after 1925.
out of the eight cases that deemed water access insufficient, only one was
214
dated prior to 1927.
This trend in case law follows the historic boom
of automotive transportation that occurred in the early twentieth
215
century.
206. Id. See also supra Part II.C.2.
207. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163, 9 N.W.2d at 426.
208. Kellett, supra note 200, at § 1(c).
209. Id.
210. See id.; see also Chandler Flyers v. Stellar Dev. Corp., 592 P.2d 387, 388 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979).
211. Carroll, supra note 62, at 476-77 (surveying the existing majority view
(reasonable necessity), minority view (strict necessity), and statutory ways of necessity).
A minority of jurisdictions have required a showing of “strict necessity” in order to
prevent unlawful entrance onto the land of others. Id. In order to satisfy the “strict
necessity” requirement, no alternative access may exist. Id.
212. Id. at 477. Some states, however, deem compliance with any available common
law options a prerequisite to petitioning for a statutory remedy. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-66-401 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (2002); IND. CODE § 3223-3-1 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 6 (2002). Florida, for example, has clarified any
confusion between common law easements and statutory easements by codifying both.
FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002).
213. Carroll, supra note 62, at 477.
214. Id. The inability of water access to meet the requirements of a property’s use
has been recognized since the 1900s. See Feoffees v. Proprietors of Jeffrey’s Neck
Pasture, 55 N.E. 462, 463 (Mass. 1899) (recognizing a split in jurisdictions regarding
water access and necessity).
215. The modern trend that has occurred since the 1920s is specifically addressed in
Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). The Cale court
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This apparent transition in the case law is logical in light of the
nation’s contemporaneous development that occurred in the Roaring
’20s. The United States shined throughout the 1920s, skyrocketing its
gross national product and wealth; jobs, earnings, and consumption by
216
American citizens simultaneously increased at a tremendous rate.
The
217
automobile industry shared in America’s success.
The automobile
made the single most-important impact on the nation’s economy during
this decisive period, employed 7.1% of the nation’s industrial workforce,
218
and paid 8.7% of its wages.
Throughout the ’20s, the automobile
transformed America’s culture and landscape, proving itself to be a
219
revolution.
Since 1966, the vast majority of cases addressing water access have
similarly found water access to be unreasonable in light of current modes
220
of transportation.
Even in those jurisdictions requiring the access need
to be “absolute,” exceptions have been found where water access is

further stated no evidence existed to indicate access by boat over water would be
reasonable or practicable. Id.
216. BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 367. Throughout the decade, the nation’s gross
national product increased from $74 billion to $104 billion. Id. The nation’s wealth
soared from $192 billion in 1914 to $367 billion by 1929. Id. The significance of such
exponential growth to Americans was, quite simply, more jobs. Id. American workers
enjoyed a 26% increase in real earnings over the decade. Id. Such an increase
necessarily resulted in comparable increases in consumption. Id. The number of homes
with automobiles jumped from 25% to 60%. Id.
217. During the 1920s, automobile sales rose from 1.9 million to 4.5 million,
accounting for $3 billion in sales. BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 384-85. In 1920,
200,000 cars were on the road; by 1929 there were 23 million. Id.
218. Id. at 385. In 1929 it was estimated that one in nine American workers was
employed either by the automobile industry or one directly related to it. Id.
219. Id. Social ramifications of the automobile industry included the phenomenon of
suburbia by encouraging movement away from city centers and continual connections
between urban and rural America. Id. Physically, 10,000 miles of paved highway were
being laid down by the United States government annually. Id.
220. See, e.g., Chandler Flyer, Inc. v. Stellar Dev. Corp., 592 P.2d 387, 388 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979) (stating that as a result of the predominance of the motor vehicle,
easements of necessity can be imposed where there is access by navigable water);
Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Me. 1993) (recognizing need to reexamine
“necessity” in light of modern transportation); Cale, 296 A.2d at 333 (stating the trend
since the 1920s is towards allowing easements despite water access due to people
“driving” and not “rowing” to work); Parker v. Putney, 492 S.E.2d 159, 161-62 (Va.
1997) (recognizing the modern view that necessity can exist where land borders a
waterway because the waterway is not suitable to meet the reasonable use requirements
of the property). Cf. McQuinn v. Tantalo 339 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
(holding that when land is accessible by water the requirement of strict necessity is not
met).
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221

deemed unreasonable.
More and more, courts have recognized that
222
travel for even short distances is most always by motor vehicle.
223
Today, motor vehicles are the predominant form of transportation.
There are therefore sound policy reasons for allowing cartways when
water access is simply unsuitable to meet the requirements of the
224
reasonable uses of property.
V. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A CHANGE
Today, Minnesota is not often thought of as it was in its original
225
The state’s meandering rivers and abundant lakes
natural abundance.
have faded in importance in the wakes of the plethora of vehicles
226
traversing the state.
From a historical perspective, the Minnesota
Supreme Court correctly ascertained the archaic legislative intent behind
227
today’s cartway statute.
Its decision, however, renders the cartway
statute incompatible with the development of transportation that has
228
The Daniel decision
occurred throughout the twentieth century.
229
indicates that the cartway statute is due for legislative amendment.
221. See Peasley v. State, 461 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1983) (recognizing an
exception to New York’s general rule that water access precludes easements by necessity
over land when the body of water has not been used as a highway for commerce and
travel for many years).
222. See, e.g., Attaway v. Davis, 707 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1986) (finding it
unreasonable to require travel by boat when today even travel of short distances is most
always by motor vehicle).
223. Chandler Flyer, 592 P.2d at 388.
224. Hancock v. Henderson, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (acknowledging sound social
policy reasons in allowing easements where land borders on navigable water).
225. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 13.
226. Minnesota’s navigable rivers in fact penetrate every portion of the state.
SCHMAHL, supra note 18, at 199. However, this has by no means hindered the continuous
dependence on motorized vehicles. In Minnesota, vehicle miles traveled per person have
risen every year in the past two decades. They increased 53% between 1980 and 2001.
Minnesota Department of Administration, Minnesota Milestones: Measures that Matter,
at http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/mm/indicator.html?Id=57 (last visited Dec. 6, 2003)
(utilizing data from the Minnesota Department of Transportation to graph the increase in
vehicle miles traveled by Minnesotans throughout the years).
227. See supra Part IV.A.2.
228. The law must take into account changing conditions when it is applied to
present-day problems. See Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965). Access to property by boat may have been reasonable and practicable a century
ago; today it is not. Id.
229. A month after the Daniel decision, legislation was introduced in both the
Minnesota House of Representatives and the Senate to remedy the court’s decision. See
H.R. B. 1303, 2003 83rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003) and S. B. 1137, 2003
83rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us/
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Ramifications of the Daniel decision are likely to undulate
throughout the state as water resources formulate a vital branch of not
230
only the recreational industry, but Minnesotans’ pride.
Had the court
held any other way, it would have opened the floodgates to all lakeshore
property owners to receive cartways across the adjoining land. Any such
decision would necessarily ripple throughout Minnesota’s massive
231
acreage of lakefront property.
The court, therefore, correctly refrained
from imposing any such burden on Minnesotan property owners. The
legislature is the sole source of any statutory alteration that would have
232
such resounding implications on Minnesota’s “10,000 lakes.”

leg/statutes.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2003). Both the House and Senate bills proposed
amending the cartway statue to read “who has no access thereto except over a navigable
waterway or over the lands of others.” Id. The Senate bill was introduced first, and was
prompted by the Minnesota Department of Transportation in response to the
ramifications of the Daniel decision. E-mail to author from John Pollard of the Senate
Transportation Policy and Budget Division (July 24, 2003) (on file with author). The
Senate bill currently resides in the Transportation Policy and Budget Division. Id. The
House bill currently resides in the Transportation Policy Committee, where it has not
been considered but is pending for hearing during the remainder of the legislative session.
E-mail to author from Chuck Norenberg, Ways and Means Comm. Administrator,
Minnesota House of Representatives (July 23, 2003) (on file with author).
230. TESTER, supra note 8, at 223. “Lakes are like sparkling jewels in their effect on
humans and in their contribution to Minnesota’s environment.” Id. This explains why
Minnesotans spend nearly 25% of their recreational hours fishing, swimming, or boating.
Id.
231. Lake Vermillion is only one of Minnesota’s 11,842 lakes, and alone has 2653
improved properties, of which 29% (760) have water access only. Appellant’s Brief,
supra note 81, at 11.
232. “A lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature; it is the earth’s
eye. Looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature. The
fluviatile trees next the shore are the slender eyelashes which fringe it, and the wooded
hills and cliffs around are its overhanging brows.” HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN
186 (J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., Princeton, 1971).
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